«The style of disruption, which first emerged in Los Angeles and then expressed itself again in Chicago last year, was enhanced in Minneapolis. It is now spreading to other liberal cities that are preparing for their own siege. It’s a sign of how the protest strategy against the Donald Trump administration is moving beyond campaign rallies to direct action. It is morphing into one of the most significant civil disobedience efforts in America since the civil rights movement [in the 1960s]»

(The Economist, 01/29/26)

«(…) we call dialectic the superior rational movement, in which such terms [being and nothingness], which seem absolutely separate, pass over into one another, by means of what they are; and so the presupposition [of their being separate] is removed. The immanent dialectical nature of being and nothingness themselves consists in the fact that they show their unity, that is becoming, as their truth» (Hegel, 1982: 135/6).

Political report delivered at the recent NMAS National Convention, December 2025, Astros and Picadero theaters, slightly edited after the international events of early 2026.

The first idea I want to convey is that we should approach this plenary—the three days and the working groups—as days of days of political and party-building work. We see them as an opportunity to reflect on the national and international political situation, but above all on the present stage of construction of our party (Nuevo MAS) and our international current (Socialism or Barbarism): its strengths and difficulties, its contradictions, and its apparent “dead ends.” In short, everything related to the dialectic of party-building and of the current, inseparable from the dialectic of the class struggle.

The aim is to concentrate our efforts and, through collective debate, identify those key lines that allow us to make a qualitative leap in our construction, thereby also contributing to the building of our international current. This plenary should help us bring 2025 to a close and anticipate 2026, functioning as a space of genuine collective elaboration.

1- From reaction to revolution

The first point is a definition of contrasts. The new global stage we are living through presents a new totality of problems that are hardly under control. They are not: the seismic movements taking place in the world are, by definition, beyond control. There is a problem of global governance; the problems accumulated in twenty-first-century capitalism are so immense that there is a crisis in the management of the system.

Two definitions operate in a contradictory way: that of the revolutionary stage that has opened up (to define it in a summarized manner), and that of the reactionary conjuncture, with its adversities and potentialities. The set of contradictions of capitalism in this twenty-first century is so great that, stated exaggeratedly, it calls into question the very existence of the capitalist system in its capacity to manage human and natural issues. If the end of the twentieth century seemed to signify the “end of history,” this third decade of the twenty-first century shows that history is more open than ever.

The world capitalist equilibrium is broken. The old postwar world order has come to an end, and we have returned to an era of territorialized imperialism; or, to put it bluntly, ‘the return of gunboat capitalism” as described in a recent editorial in The Economist. Trump’s grab at Venezuela, the arm-wrestling over Greenland, the attempt at regency in Gaza, his intrusion into the affairs of multinational corporations, the divisions that are beginning to emerge within the Western bourgeoisie, and so on, all bear this out: the objective pre-revolutionary conditions of the international class struggle are being forged

Subjectively, especially in this first month of 2026, there has been a leap in the international class struggle. There had already been an initial “warning signal” in the form of political general strikes in Italy; we have the popular rebellion in Iran, brutally repressed; and now, above all, the popular uprising in Minneapolis, which is already historic. The United States has become the center of the global class struggle, a center in which elements of civil war are being expressed:

“At times, Minneapolis reminds me of what I witnessed during the Arab Spring in 2011: a series of street clashes between demonstrators and police that quickly turned into a far broader struggle against autocracy. As in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, Minneapolis has shown a massive civil uprising, in which a vanguard of protesters gained strength as many others—without progressive convictions—joined in sentiment, if not always in person (…) [it is] the breath of hope that Minnesota can offer the rest of the country through a model of democratic resistance.”

(“The American Winter,” Robert F. Worth, The Atlantic, January 25, 2026).

The entire international scenario points to deep contradictions that are not under control (eventually pre-revolutionary, as we have just titled this section). These profound contradictions currently experienced by the capitalist system define the character of the new stage. Within this framework, at this 2025 National Plenary, as well as in the most recent meetings of our international current, we have identified the United States as the most polarized and explosive country in the world at the present stage: one of the most strategic countries today for the construction of revolutionary currents (we note that this definition was made prior to the events in Minnesota, which have fully confirmed it).

The most elementary concept of governance is the administration of “collective” affairs. Yet there is an international crisis of governance, divisions within the bourgeoisie in the West, and problems that overflow on all sides. And insofar as these problems (or systemic failures) collide with exploited and oppressed human society, a society that is alive, they add depth to reality: “The people who pursue ICE convoys (who call themselves ‘commuters,’ an expression that is partly a joke and partly an attempt to evade government surveillance) organize on a neighborhood basis through Signal groups” (The Atlantic, idem).

Reality is not composed solely, nor fundamentally, of the superstructure (of geopolitics or maneuvers at the tops). It consists of superstructural problems combined with structural and social ones; with the problems of the new world of work; with the relationship between humanity and nature; in short, of the class struggle. It is within this framework that revolutionary or pre-revolutionary conditions are forged, as well as the shifts from a reactionary conjuncture to a pre-revolutionary one.

Thus, there is a set of problems that remain open and are highly complex. There is a lack of control by (capitalist) humanity over its relationship with nature, which can have barbaric consequences and which, as such, constitutes a new problem: is humanity capable of controlling its metabolic relationship with nature? Capitalism appears not to be. This is a historical element, because such a human capacity to reverse its relationship with nature did not exist in the past. For prehistoric humans, nature was something that imposed itself upon them in an overwhelming way; in today’s humanized, or dehumanized, nature, humanity imposes itself, to a certain extent, upon terrestrial nature, and this constitutes an immense problem (one may recall here Engels’s warning that nature responds tenfold to human mistreatment).

Second problem: for example, in Argentina, what right does the bourgeoisie have to govern if it is driving the country into the ground, if it is incapable of finding a path for development?

“At present, 73% of the country’s dollar earnings comes from agribusiness concentrated in the country’s central corridor, compared to 27% generated by energy and mining. However, projections indicate that by 2030—within just four years—this equation will be reversed, with energy and mining surpassing agribusiness by a ratio of 53% to 47%. This represents a shift in the productive epicenter toward the Andean and Patagonian axes (…) Consequently, the major question is what will happen to the urban peripheries — Greater Buenos Aires above all — which will continue to concentrate the vast majority of the population, but within a context of less promising economic prospects. Argentine society is changing much faster than expected, with trends that lie beyond the government’s reach.”(Jorge Liotti, January 18, 2026).

Liotti adds another element that is strategically central: “Argentina is a country with an extremely high level of urban concentration. According to a CIPPEC report, 9 out of every 10 inhabitants live in cities—one of the highest rates in the world. This concentration reflects a twentieth-century economic model in which cities, and particularly the AMBA (Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area), attracted population due to industrial development. That picture, however, has become outdated in the face of a radical shift in economic prospects: the suburban belt now appears economically depressed by the decline of industry, construction, and commerce, while the Andean region—driven by mining—and the Patagonian region—through the takeoff of the hydrocarbon sector—are emerging with far greater potential.”(ibid.), sectors that absorb very little labor.

The elements above eventually forge both social degradation and demoralization, as well as pre-revolutionary conditions, because for such concentrated population the only things on offer are misery, precarization, and disaffection from the State—conditions that can lead to a social outburst like others Argentina has already experienced repeatedly. (In an international ranking, the country appears as the most polarized in the world—a significant fact—although we believe that today, due to historical and structural conditions, the United States is far more so: it is the country most clearly heading toward a “civil war.”)

Returning to the international level: what right does the bourgeoisie have to govern if it offers no prospects to the new generations? What legitimacy does a voracious social system have that provides no future to the majority of the exploited and oppressed, and in which 0.001% of the population holds more wealth than 50%? As reported by OXFAM in its latest report: “the wealth of billionaires increased by approximately 2.5 trillion dollars over the past year—an amount greater than the total wealth held by the poorest half of humanity (more than four billion people).” (La Nación, January 20, 2026).

Since the 2008–2009 crisis, the world economy has been in a kind of “secular stagnation,” despite extremely high levels of super-exploitation. This stagnation combines very deep forms of accumulation by dispossession (in short, extractivism), the extraction of absolute surplus value (direct super-exploitation) and relative surplus value (through AI and automation), together with economic parasitism (for example, the current relaunching of the military industry); in other words, this surplus value is not being sufficiently channeled into investment or into a sustained increase in productivity.

The world bourgeoisie spends its profits on seven-story yachts, mansions, and so on; it hoards a morbid form of wealth—alienated wealth (material wealth, not “spiritual” wealth). In Marx, the concept of wealth refers to the maximum development of all human potentialities, the very opposite of what is being experienced in the twenty-first century. Material wealth is a precondition for that development, but it is not wealth in the deepest Marxist sense of the term. On the contrary, contemporary capitalism is witnessing a decline in its indices of human development because, in addition to seeking to push human consciousness back toward irrationality, racism, misogyny, and the like, it is fiercely attacking the average standard of living of the working class as a whole.

Third problem: the geopolitical dispute that has reopened. Territorial wars of plunder are back, and inter-imperialist wars may also return (the importance of the debate over the character of China—which has torn so many currents apart—or the astonishing dispute with the European Union over Greenland are part of this).[6]

The world in which we lived was forged by three historical events of the first half of the twentieth century—the world is forged, it is constructed, it is not given; history is not made once and for all: we make it, we construct it, we are militants within it, we transform it, we revolutionize it, the exploited and oppressed, or it is made barbaric by the capitalists. Those three events were the First World War, the Second World War, and the Russian Revolution. Marx wrote that capitalism came into the world dripping with blood and mud, as occurred in the two world wars, and that the Russian Revolution opened an emancipatory window—the wager on the future, with all the birth pains involved in the opening of a new epoch for humanity.

The revolution is not yet in sight, but wars and pre-revolutionary conditions—popular rebellions—are already coming into view, altering the everyday lives of people: it is difficult to accommodate China and the United States within the same world; the Atlantic Alliance that has structured the world since the Second World War is in crisis; the European Union must combine austerity and rearmament by attacking what remains of the European welfare state; Russia’s war against Ukraine has now entered its fourth year; a genocide has taken place in Gaza; Minneapolis rises up against ICE; and so on.[7]

Wars occur, among other reasons, because the world is constituted by states that compete with one another and that have historically been, and remain, a constitutive part of capitalism, which is a world system of states contradictory to the tendency toward the globalization of the world market. The current defining feature of this system is precisely the return of states (border disputes, trade wars, the grabbing of territories, the plundering of natural resources, and so on).[8] Imagine an inter-imperialist war between the United States and China or Russia (or skirmishes involving the European Union): what would be the limits of conventional weaponry, and what would be the limits of nuclear weapons?[9]

2- Minneapolis as a Breaking Point

This unbalanced world has a fourth problem: there are clashes between states, but also between classes, something that most analysts, including marxists, fail to see, although this month of January 2026 has been instructive in this regard (one should not forget the ongoing uprising in Iran).There is also a crisis of the stable political regimes of bourgeois democracy, regimes that are not a pure abstraction or mere superstructure, but rather express specific relations of forces between classes. There are far-right governments, yet it is not so easy for them to trample the social and democratic gains of the workers’ movement, youth, and the masses, as can be clearly seen in Argentina.

There is an interplay between the far-right character of Trump, Bolsonaro in his time, and—so far, in a parodic form—Milei in Argentina, and the political regimes that, generally speaking, remain forms of bourgeois democracy. In the paradigmatic case of Trump and ICE—where the latter is a state/parastate institution—even in this case it is still not possible to properly speak of fascism, because fascism is not merely a government; it is a political regime. And the political regime in the United States, for the moment, has not changed. For it to change, Trump would have to disregard the midterm elections (concerns about this have already been expressed, for example, in The Economist), or, for instance, shut down the U.S. Congress… (Here it is worth briefly clarifying the character of ICE. It contains elements of paramilitary organization, something new that is relevant to how the Trump administration should be characterized. However, we do not believe that this alone has altered the U.S. political regime, at least not for now.)[10]

Democratic tasks, intertwined with social ones, are of fundamental importance in the present period. It is a mistake to subordinate or condition them in a sectarian way. At the same time, however, they must be linked to a permanentist dynamic. At this moment, the right of Ukraine to self-determination once again comes to the fore. We place no conditions on that right; otherwise it would cease to be a right at all. This does not mean that our program ends there. On the contrary, our program is clearly aimed at the refoundation of an independent Ukraine in an authentically working-class, popular, and socialist sense. The same applies to Taiwan, Greenland, or Venezuela. We do not place conditions on their right to self-determination, even though our perspective is revolutionary and socialist. If we were to impose conditions, we would no longer be defending the right to self-determination in the Leninist tradition; we would instead move toward the position of Rosa Luxemburg, who opposed Poland’s right to self-determination in relation to Russia arguing that it ‘divided the working class’. That position was also opposed to Marx’s, who unconditionally defended Ireland’s right to self-determination with respect to Great Britain. English workers, he argued, must fight for Irish independence if they wish to rid themselves of their own chains—in so many words.[11].

Trump is a far-right government, but it is not fascist: why? Because he cannot shut down parliament; in analysis, it is necessary to distinguish between governments and regimes. Milei’s figure is a caricature of the far right: he addressed the country with his back to Congress, but he was unable to shut it down, or even to override it (he depends on building majorities within it), and even less was he able to overcome the streets–congress dialectic that characterizes Argentina and makes this country beautiful (just as the bourgeoisie makes it ugly, the mass movement makes it beautiful): “Neither a military dictatorship nor a pure police state—to say nothing of an absolute monarchy—possesses sufficient capacity to atomize and demobilize for a prolonged period a conscious social class composed of millions of men and women, and therefore to prevent the reemergence of even the most elementary class struggle periodically produced by the simple operation of the laws of the market” (Mandel, 1973: 265).[12]

As Lenin affirmed—and we insist on the full contemporary relevance of Leninism thought in the present stage—bourgeois democracy is a regime of stability because it is a deception, sustained through voting and popular consent, however distorted that consent may be. Governments in crisis tend toward bonapartist and authoritarian forms; yet to become authoritarian requires a different balance of forces that makes it possible, and this has yet to be demonstrated. In that sense, we are living through a kind of “international bonapartism” under Trump. Still, it is crucial to be clear that the U.S. regime is not yet fully bonapartist. Trump is also “Mr. TACO” (“Trump Always Chickens Out”): he expresses the existing balance of forces. He advances, tests the terrain, retreats, and then advances again. The cycle continues without the balance of forces being definitively resolved, and it can evolve either toward more brutally reactionary scenarios or toward pre-revolutionary ones.

Let us recall that our definition is that we are living in a reactionary international conjuncture, marked by a profound process of asymmetric polarization in which the balance of forces has not been settled and in which elements of “civil war” are beginning to appear in the United States.

In sum, Trump’s government represents a kind of “international bonapartism.” However—and this is crucial—it is a form of bonapartism that combines danger with elements of weakness. This dialectic of weakness and danger is essential for understanding both the risks and the possibilities of destabilization entailed by these governments.[13]

All of these elements configure the new global stage: a stage of crisis—ecological, economic, social, and more—of wars, some of them already genocidal, as in Palestine; of reaction, in the form of far-right governments; but also of rebellions, civil wars, and potentially revolutions. Why revolutions? Because profoundly disrupting the lives of the exploited and oppressed—the lives of our class and our youth—can sometimes produce demoralization, and at other times revolutionary responses. New social revolutions may emerge, even though there have been none over the past fifty years. That is already far too long without social revolutions, and at the “least expected” moment they will return—although for that to happen, sustained and determined work and construction are required. “(…) ‘I never thought it would be from our own government that we would have to protect our children (…) We keep them physically safe, but they see what is happening.’ (…) Children became a moral limit for many of the people I met in the Twin Cities [Minneapolis and St. Paul]” (The Atlantic, idem).[14]

The global conjuncture remains reactionary, but polarization has increasingly cut both ways in recent months. Before Minneapolis, the most emblematic development was the political general strike in Italy over Gaza. This was followed by the two “No Kings” marches in the United States, the popular urban uprisings in Los Angeles and Chicago against ICE, the mass mobilizations in Iran, and now Minneapolis.

At the same time, there is a reactionary offensive against Venezuela and the capitulation of the Maduro regime in the face of Trump. This offensive is actively aided by the country’s social decomposition, which plays into the hands of reaction and is the result of the political inconsistency of chavismo. The danger now extends to Cuba, which Trump seeks to strangle if the regime does not shift to his geopolitical camp. Trump does not appear to be pursuing regime change as such, but rather to force existing regimes to realign geopolitically under U.S. pressure.

The massive degradation of circumstances in Venezuela has, for the time being, obstructed political clarity around the situation, thereby blocking the emergence of an anti-imperialist form of resistance. By contrast, the events in Minneapolis are not burdened by that constraint and therefore give rise much more directly to anti-capitalist sentiments. The far right retains the initiative, but Trump is also TACO. There is a genocide in Gaza: Gaza has been destroyed, yet there is a Palestinian resistance that refuses to leave its land. This once again brings to the fore the question of national emancipation (Ukraine, with all its specificities, stands as a parallel case).

Any analysis that limits itself to waving the far-right boogeyman while ignoring the response from the grassroots is one-sided. Italy had been living through a long defeat since the late 1970s. Tony Negri’s autobiography is instructive in this regard: “The assassination of Aldo Moro was more than criminal, because—as the movement’s newspapers understood and wrote the day after the kidnapping—it enabled and legitimized a ferocious repression that destroyed antagonistic social movements. But even more criminal was the judicial fabrication that sought to accuse an entire generation of that crime. Look at Italy today: its intellectual misery, political pettiness, moral weakness. That decay began with the destruction of the generation in movement and revolt in the 1970s—since then, in the bel paese, there has been no generation, only corruption.” (Negri, 2022: 33). As can be seen by contrast, the most recent general strikes have begun to reverse this condition of defeat that had prevailed in Italy since the late 1970s. There was a political general strike in solidarity with Palestine, organized by unions that positioned themselves to the left of the traditional trade-union bureaucracy. One, two general strikes—these must be among the most important mass events of the class struggle in Italy in many years.[15] A political general strike is an act of pure solidarity: it is a strike around universal interests, not merely sectoral demands. Its very concept exceeds the narrow framework imposed by the bureaucracy, whose role is precisely to confine struggles to narrow sectional demands and block the political strike.

The struggle against ICE in the U.S., which we have been discussing, shows that the new social world of the exploited and oppressed has an enormous richness.If the postwar workers’ movement was heavily male-dominated and highly homogeneous, this type of heterogeneity “fragments” but also, in a certain sense, universalizes and enriches, because it is men, women, trans people, Chicanos, Arabs—everything: an enormous new wealth and potentialities of the social world expressing this restart of historical experience that we have been talking about for years in our current.

Of course, this also provokes a far-right reaction—a true “assault on reason”—as seen in the visceral hostility triggered by Pride marches around the world, which are perhaps the largest mass mobilizations today.

But ICE has the potential to blow the United States apart, because it triggers elements of civil war. The country is a genuine social powder keg, a historical palimpsest—a layered text written over time—formed by overlapping relations of exploitation and oppression. “Such callous disruption, destructiveness, and brutality, not limited to just a few sectors, but taking place in numerous directions at the same time, has amounted to an overreach that has made even some Trumpist constituencies uneasy. While none of this portends something like what Nixon experienced, forced to resign eighteen months after beginning his second term, it is clear that the public has turned against Trump, as seen both in elections and in numerous opinion polls showing his support at below 40 percent.” (Kevin Anderson, “Trumpist fascism: The Worm Turns,” 12/27/25, an article written, as can be seen, before the events in Minneapolis).

And it is no accident that the International Gig Workers Congress of, which next May will hold its second edition with the participation of 25 countries—in which we play a leading role alongside the SEIU—will be in Los Angeles. Our still limited international current nevertheless reflects that new social world: the new working class and the youth who are transforming that “social world.” At the pre-founding meeting of SoB France last November there were young Algerians and Tunisians, trans youth, students, workers, it was super diverse.

And there is another issue that needs to be developed, one that bears directly on international pre-revolutionary conditions: the existence of an international split within the bourgeoisie. On the one hand, there is the classic neoliberal, globalist imperialist bourgeoisie, represented by the Democrats in the United States and, more broadly, by the governments of the European Union; on the other, there is a “revisionist” imperialist bourgeoisie of the old order, represented by Trump and by Xi Jinping—the latter in a different sense, since he is economically globalist, as the old global order benefits China in economic terms, though not politically. This, too, is something new: up to now, what we had experienced was the unity of the Western imperialist bourgeoisie. (In the 1980s, Nahuel Moreno went too far when he spoke of a “world counterrevolutionary front” to describe this emerging neoliberal imperialist unity, but that exaggerated formulation nonetheless contained an element of truth.)

Well, that is over: the international imperialist consent has broken down, along with the emergence of new imperialisms and new regional powers. And these contradictions and fissures are also what shape the configuration of the new stage as a stage of crisis, wars, reaction, and revolutions: “When the owners of some of the world’s largest companies gather on the Swiss mountain of Davos, a central concern will be the striking intrusion of governments into their cross-border negotiations. With war having returned to Europe, and with a more assertive authoritarian China, politicians have redrawn the map of global business, determining where multinationals can operate and where they cannot. The American president, Donald Trump, has taken matters further. He sees companies as a useful tool for enhancing state power [that is, the economy placed at the service of politics, ‘The Age of Combustion’]. He has urged the heads of U.S. oil companies to return to Caracas or face sanctions, pressured defense firms to stop granting concessions, and demanded that technology companies selling advanced processors to China cut off those sales to its government (…) Transformations in the geopolitical order [and the divisions within the imperialist bourgeoisie, we might add] are at this moment reshaping Western multinationals” (TE, “America’s gunboat capitalism will make the world poorer,” 01/15/26).[16]

Two general questions compete here, forming a dialectical unity. One is: why are these governments so reactionary? The truth is that, at bottom, it refers to a profound imbalance in the management of capitalism. In the ’90s we experienced a ‘Kautskyan moment’—Kautsky was a social-democratic theorist who said that capitalism, by its own development, tends to attenuate contradictions. Now we have returned to a “leninist moment,” because Lenin said that capitalism is contradiction, it is exploitative. It is a simple idea: a system of exploitation and oppression is unlikely to be stable, to tend toward equilibrium and harmony. Communism and socialism are linked to harmonious coexistence; brutal conditions of exploitation do not tend toward harmonious human relations, because they challenge you all the time.

Why do we say that history is open? Because the body of society is a living body, and if it is attacked, how is harmony to be achieved? The reformist idea, which has failed, is that contradictions tend to be reabsorbed because the development of capitalism is linear, and the revolutionary idea is that capitalism is self-contradictory, with breaks, ruptures, revolutions—read Lenin’s 1914 essay *Karl Marx*.

Capitalism is not a harmonious society, and the absorption of contradictions has been proven false; on the contrary, we are living an update of capitalism’s destructive tendencies, which is why the moment tends to be leninist. Kautsky said there is a tendency toward the “harmonization of contradictions” because capitalism is progress, but capitalism is progress and regression, and Marx’s work must be read dialectically. In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx argues that capitalism constantly revolutionizes relations of production and human relations, but it does not revolutionize them tending toward harmony but toward super-exploitation: that is the intimate logic of capitalism.

Of course, this follows a rhythm of “systole and diastole”; there are stages of reaction and stages of reabsorption; the postwar period, after two world wars, was a stage of reabsorption and concessions. Well, now we have entered a revolutionary stage in which capitalism reacts brutally, and it turns out that the balance of forces is not so easy to trample and imposes certain limits. There is the dialectic of the thing: if they overtighten the screw in challenging that balance of forces, they can blow everything up—this is what “reformists” (the Democrats in the U.S., for example) are afraid of.

Trotsky said—as early as 1930—that the U.S., as the world’s leading metropolis, had brought within the U.S. the contradictions of the whole world. China does not seem so universal, even if Southeast Asia is at the center of the world economy: the dominant culture in the last two centuries has been Western. The U.S. is a powder keg where the greatest wealth of identities and the greatest concentration of migrant population coexist with the Ku Klux Klan. A recent article asked: “Civil war in the U.S.?” and yes, it is possible.

Reaction emerges from global imbalance, and it has ingredients that fascism also had, although today’s reaction is not fascism because it does not have what it takes yet. Reaction believes to act with impunity. It is the child of a declining middle class afraid of losing its privileges; in the nineteenth-century U.S. Civil War, the social base of the slaveholding Southern army consisted largely of propertyless white petty-bourgeois layers. Today there is a disproportion between reaction and the new social world, which is a conquest of humanity, and there’s a fierce clash between both. How does a precarized person naturalize their condition of precariousness? They are aware of being precarious, and they do not want to be.

So the question of what to do with the United States is now squarely on our agenda. We have a window of opportunity—and that is a fact. In international debate, it is a classic question to ask where the center of the world revolution lies. Today, that center is the United States. And who could have imagined that this country would appear on the radar of world revolution, coming as it does from the United States of Reagan only a few decades ago? Capitalism is profoundly contradictory. And when we say that history is open, it turns out that it is open first and foremost in the United States.

3- The Dialectic of Revolutionary Construction

So, the first point is that we are building this current and this party within a world of voracious capitalism and twenty-first-century territorial imperialism. Are we prepared for revolutions? Not yet. Preparation is difficult precisely because it requires anticipation. The paradox of revolutionary construction—the counterintuitive aspect—is that its most essential work must be carried out under non-revolutionary conditions, against the prevailing current. When revolution arrives, if the party has not already been built, it cannot fulfill an objective revolutionary role.[17]

Obviously, revolutions do not happen overnight; they are forged in the conditions that make them possible. Are those conditions already in place? They are beginning to take shape. Are we prepared for harsher conditions? Not yet. We prepare ourselves intellectually, fully aware that such harsher conditions are approaching. But preparing for revolutions cannot be reduced to ‘theoretical swimming lessons’—one has to “jump into the pool.” And that is where practice and experience come in; that is where the need for the party and the current to grow becomes decisive: to win more women and men workers.

By its very composition, the party is a “collective intellectual,” but experience is not acquired through intellectual work alone. How do the party and the current gain experience? By turning ourselves all into proletarians? No. Experience is gained by building the party as a “community” that brings together youth and workers. That is a step the party has set itself to take in the coming period, without losing sight of the fact that our primary objective in Argentina remains to become the strongest trotskyist current among youth.

Youth have less real-life and work experience than the working class. Working-class life is lived under far harsher conditions: an often brutal war of all against all, forms of ideological and social backwardness, and the constant need to fight to earn one’s place in the workplace—to assert oneself on the shop floor, to avoid being exploited through “paying one’s dues,” and to learn from those who can actually pass on experience. That is what we mean by real life.

A strictly youth-based current has little of that “real life.” We have an enormously valuable youth current, with a great deal of future potential, but not much real-life experience; we are missing quite a lot in that respect. This is not only due to our own shortcomings, but also because, in a certain sense, reality itself has been “unreal.” That unreality, however, is coming to an end, and we must be prepared.

We went through several tests in the recent period. We confronted the first impact of Milei and warned—before anyone else—about his “declaration of war on workers.” Moreover, we were on the front lines during the confrontations of late 2023 and the first half of 2024. In a certain sense, Milei was checked fairly quickly: he is a danger, but he lacks the organizational capacity to destroy everything he would like. That is why our analysis has been objective rather than impressionistic. We did not take shortcuts; we warned that he was not a “cuddly kitten”—that kind of talk belongs to people who live in the corridors of Congress. There is no doubt that working people’s daily lives have become harsher under Milei, people cannot even afford the most basic daily necessities and living conditions have deteriorated enormously.

All of this feeds into our understanding of the period and of this plenary, which is conceived as one of party preparation.

Turning to Argentina, the government is still not fully stabilized. Milei won the midterm elections and managed to get the budget approved. Beyond that, he is now seeking to push through an ultra-exploitative labor reform (debate in the Senate begins on Wednesday, February 11). This reform slashes severance pay, allows wages to be paid in kind—or in any currency—abolishes the ultra-activity of collective agreements (under which expired agreements remain in force until a new agreement is negotiated) as well as sector-wide collective bargaining agreements, permits the legal workday to be extended to 12 hours, and, through the introduction of working-time banks, effectively eliminates overtime pay. It also fragments paid leave and includes many other measures, among them legally denying the existence of an employment relationship for delivery workers by classifying them as “independent contractors”—an issue that SiTraRepA has been denouncing in major media outlets for weeks.

The CGT (General Confederation of Labour) is cutting backroom deals on all sides, while Peronism limits itself to staging a purely formal “opposition”: casting token votes against without blocking anything in practice. Peronist leaders have already suggested that they lack any real room for maneuver—but that is simply not true. In reality, they allow the bill to go through without provoking any mobilization in order to stay on good terms with the business class.

The real question, then, is not whether the government wants to push through a Thatcherite labor counter-reform, but whether the existing balance of social and political forces actually allows it to do so. Is it really inevitable, as both the PTS and the PO claim in unison, that the law will pass? We find this assessment defeatist—especially in a country like Argentina, where social contradictions, even if they are not openly visible in January 2026, remain acute and can erupt again at any moment.

Naturally, this will have to be tested in practice. The government’s wager is to operate with its back turned to society, in the middle of the summer, and to try to force the counter-reform through during the special legislative sessions. Since it was impossible to do so in December, it is now betting on getting it through in February. The government knows that once the year truly begins in March—with all the additional expenses that come with the start of the school year, after the temporary “breathing space” of the holidays has worn off, and when people are forced to climb the uphill slope of a long year under extremely poor conditions of wages, employment, public transportation, and so on—the country’s social climate could boil over.

Timelines may unfold differently. We did not expect a social explosion like the one against Macri in December 2017, in part because the labor reform has not yet entered formal debate—meaning that, for broad layers of society, the issue remains abstract. What we do expect, rather, is a scenario similar to late 2023 and the first half of 2024, but shifted forward in time. Whether this actually materializes will have to be determined through experience.

Contradictions have already begun to surface. Even though the CGT and the Peronist Party remain inactive, provincial governors are challenging certain tax-related provisions of the bill—most notably the income tax component, which is shared with the provinces and would result in an estimated loss of 1.2 trillion pesos in annual revenue. At the same time, CAME (the Argentine Confederation of Medium-Sized Enterprises) has objected to the elimination of ultra-activity, arguing that it would introduce legal uncertainty into the bill due to the likely unconstitutionality of such a measure, and has therefore called for those articles to be removed, among other objections.

To make matters even more complicated, the government has presented a bill that merges labor, union, and tax provisions into a single piece of legislation, thereby adding further layers of complexity to the contradictions already at play.

Although a reactionary phase opened in 2023 and Milei’s government clearly has an extreme-right orientation, its concrete results so far have fallen short of its ambitions—except in the area of austerity, where the impact has been brutal.

ilei has managed to win the midterm elections and to survive the crucial October electoral test—largely thanks to the capitulation of Peronism, the country’s main opposition political force, which chose not to confront him during the most critical moments of the second half of last year. He now openly aspires to be re-elected in 2027, and the political struggle over that election has already begun.

He enjoys the support of Donald Trump, the International Monetary Fund, and sectors of the Argentine business class. At the same time, his open clashes with powerful industrial figures—such as Paolo Rocca—over the tension between economic liberalization and protectionism reveal growing divisions within the bourgeoisie itself. Milei also benefits from a form of so-called ‘guaranteed governability’ provided by Peronist legislators and the union bureaucracy, who have so far acted more as a force of containment than as an opposition.

Yet there are two fundamental and decisive objectives that the government has not achieved. First, it has not defeated the balance of social and political forces shaped by two major historical turning points: the democratic transition of 1982–83, which followed the military dictatorship, and the mass popular uprising of 2001, which imposed limits on neoliberal restructuring. In other words, Milei has not succeeded in transforming Argentina’s political regime of bourgeois democracy. Second, he has not fully dismantled the social and democratic conquests won in 2001—although these gains have been significantly eroded.[18] Argentina is therefore not yet the ‘normal’ country its ruling elites desire.

What, then, do the existing relations of forces—combined with Peronist political containment—actually allow Milei to do? They allow him to win elections; to receive backing from international actors such as Trump; and quite possibly to remain in office until 2027 without being forcibly removed. They also allow him to push sections of the labor movement into a defensive posture, fostering the sense that no real alternative exists.

Milei’s government is dangerous because it seeks to dismantle what we call “industrial Argentina.” We do not defend the industrial bourgeoisie, but rather the productive network of the working class built around industry. His project is to transform the country from a dependent capitalist economy into a semi-colonial, extractivist one.

Earlier, drawing on Lenin, we discussed how countries are positioned within the global system of states. Because of its industrial base, its level of urban concentration, and the training of its workforce, Argentina is still a dependent country. But the government’s drive to re-primarize the economy, its brutal attack on public education and infrastructure, and its push to open the economy across the board—without limits or safeguards—are aimed at pushing the country toward a semi-colonial situation.

So what do the current relations of forces between classes actually permit? it doesn’t look like they’re enough for the government to simply steamroll society—though, of course, that can only be settled in experience. Milei tried to change the balance of forces forged in 1983 and in 2001, but he hasn’t been able to break them. And we still don’t know whether, once people grasp what the labor law actually contains—even in a country where roughly half the workforce is already precarious—something like a social outburst could go off. As of today, January 31, it’s impossible to say, because society is, in a sense, still on summer vacation.

As for Peronism, the capitulation is disgraceful. When SiTraRepA appeared before Congress in the last days of December, Peronist deputies were already whining that “the labor reform has basically already passed”—which is close to what the FITU has been saying as well.[19] Meanwhile, Jaquelin, a leading columnist at La Nación, has been sharper than much of the left parties on this point: he keeps arguing that “the votes are there,” unless the class struggle changes that. For now, the pressure has come from provincial governors who don’t want to give up 1.2 trillion pesos a year in shared tax revenue.

The problem is that a labor counter-reform of this magnitude is typically the objective of a military dictatorship. It is therefore legitimate to ask what the real core of this reform actually is—and what its true character may be. Is it merely a counter-reform? Is it a counter-revolution? A form of enforced hyper-exploitation? A radical downgrading of labor? Total precarization? In the end, the question is: what kind of labor reform, and for what kind of country? Because the answer to the first depends on the second.

The goal is to atomize the labor movement, and from that standpoint the project is counter-revolutionary. But achieving a counter-revolutionary objective is extremely difficult under a bourgeois-democratic regime. In Peru, Fujimori carried out a self-coup in 1992, shut down Congress, and then went on to murder between 80,000 and 90,000 people from the country’s Indigenous population—while also crushing the Peruvian working class, which had its own historical traditions. (The Velasco Alvarado dictatorship in the 1970s, for example, had pursued an industrializing project.)

Milei claims he wants Argentina to become “like Peru,” yet even Argentina’s own military dictatorship failed to fully defeat the working class. It crushed the class-struggle vanguard, but it was careful not to provoke the union bureaucracy outright.

4- The Contemporaneity of Our Current

Within the working class, there is still a burden that many political currents fail to grasp because they function as a sect: mention socialism and some people immediately respond: ‘Chernobyl’. That has to be answered. The crisis of alternatives is not merely ideological; it stems from the fact that the first revolutions of the twentieth century became bureaucratized and ultimately ceased to function as a real alternative for the mass movement.

It is necessary to explain that those revolutions were a first attempt—much as Rosa Luxemburg put it in her famous pamphlet on the Bolsheviks (The Russian Revolution): one cannot demand that the first attempt at proletarian revolution, under such difficult conditions, serve as a model of socialism and democracy. But she was saying this to the Bolsheviks—not to Stalin, who represented the counterrevolution. The aspiration of this current—ambitious as it is—is to contribute to a second round of historical experience with socialist revolution and anti-capitalism. The conclusions drawn from that experience—theoretical and strategic elaboration—are therefore essential, because there was a first round and we cannot simply pretend it never happened. That is precisely what some absurd currents do—such as the PTS—by failing to respond to what people immediately bring up. If someone mentions Chávez, that experience is relatively superficial; but if they say “Chernobyl,” you have to answer that. What they are pointing out, is the failure of bureaucratic planning: total negligence, the disappearance of real planning within the plan itself (as Moshe Lewin argued)—in other words, something that was not socialist planning at all.

The Stalinist USSR functioned as a collection of enterprises competing with one another: bargaining among bureaucrats, an anarchic competition of firm against firm. Planning did not really exist. Labor power and raw materials were stocked uselessly, simply to meet the plan’s formal targets. This has gone largely unexplained for fifty years, because we are surrounded by political currents that function as sects and are incapable of serious reflection. So how is planning actually carried out? It is not simple. But are we really not going to discuss any of this?

That is the logic of a sect: never confronting real problems. Within PTS’s international current, they have been locked for years in disputes over how to characterize China—today’s thoroughly ultra-capitalist China. When the Chinese Revolution took place, it was difficult to point out; it was a major revolution, and one could debate it for years precisely because of its complexity. But today, discussing ultra-capitalist China? They have been debating China for ten years without a single Chinese member. In the postwar period, Trotskyism debated revolutions extensively because they were frustrated processes of social transformation. But today there is hardly a society with more intense exploitation than China (to put it somewhat starkly). Does China really generate that many doubts?

This reflects a complete lack of connection with the mass movement: debating abstractions—whether a given percentage of state ownership is enough to label a society a “workers’ state.”[20] China undoubtedly displays immense wealth and social complexity as a social formation, but our analysis is class-based and socialist.

A friend of one of our comrades traveled to China and met some middle-class young people there. They showed up in a Mercedes-Benz. She asked her friend, “Did you see any Chinese workers?” “No,” she replied. “They were nothing but tiny black dots in the distance.” What a wonderful ‘workers’ state’!

This is a theoretical and strategic discussion whose main difficulty lies in the absence of a reference point like the one that existed at the beginning of the twentieth century, when socialism functioned as a living promise within Europe’s working masses. Today’s world is extraordinarily rich in experience. There is a growing, lived experience of capitalism, and anti-capitalism is expanding—but it has not yet crystallized into a credible emancipatory promise for millions. Reactionary forces are challenging the conquests of the bourgeois revolution, not those of the socialist revolution. The world is headed toward explosion because they are trying to drag society back to the seventeenth century while we live in the twenty-first. Human society cannot be reduced to capitalist elements alone; that is a sect-like perspective. This is why the concept of the Anthropocene is more useful than that of the Capitalocene: even in a transition to socialism, problems in humanity’s relationship with nature will persist. History moves dialectically, through advances and setbacks. The alternatives remain socialism or barbarism. Humanity has made enormous advances—and today a reactionary wave is calling them into question.

Returning to the problem of the working class: its level of consciousness today starts from further back. It has always been more difficult, because the factory—or the workplace more broadly—functions as an institution of confinement, much like prisons or psychiatric hospitals.You come home after twelve hours on the job, you sleep, and you go back to work; life is lived inside the workplace.

Some countries have undergone deindustrialization, while others have not, and the traditional imperialist bourgeoisie is now concerned with reindustrialization. This means that in ten or fifteen years there will once again be a larger working class in the core countries. At the same time, there are regions that remain largely untouched: projections suggest that by 2050 the largest growth of the industrial proletariat will take place in Africa.

There is another point to make: the process of recomposition of the working class is beginning in a more political register, rather than primarily around immediate demands. The World Congress of Gig Workers, although still at a vanguard level, is a political process. The debate led by Sitrarepa over recognition of the employment relationship is likewise political, not merely centered on immediate demands. That is why, in relation to the labor counter-reform, we use the concept of counterrevolution: it strikes at the very basis of class self-recognition. The aim is to atomize the working class. And this is logical, because the central problem for capitalism in Argentina is precisely who dares to take on the working class as a collective force.

Another key point in the discussion is the contemporaneity of the current. We can be contemporary because we settled accounts with Stalinism twenty years ago. As recently as five years ago, the PTS and the PO still argued that China was a “workers’ state. This is not a trivial issue. If you define China as a workers’ state—or even as a capitalist state that is not imperialist—you end up siding with China  against the United States, in a world where inter-imperialist wars are a real possibility. One would need to be present in China to grasp its reality, yet there is no trotskyism there—partly because Mao exterminated the trotskyists, just as Ho Chi Minh did in Vietnam. We do not characterize China or Vietnam of that period solely on that basis, but we also cannot characterize them without taking it into account. Likewise, we do not define the stalinist USSR only by the purges—but we cannot define it without them either.

There are limits to what can be swallowed. An atomized working class cannot exercise power, and if it does not exercise power, it is very hard to define that society as a workers’ state. That kind of argument reflects an empiricist marxism—one that treats social relations as “non-human” or even “post-human”, as mere relations between objects rather than between people.

We are not naïve or sentimental humanists. At certain moments, to execute the enemy becomes a material necessity. Reaction must be defeated forcefully; there is no revolution without violence. Marxism is shaped by a dialectic between utopian aspiration and hard political realism, and it holds both tensions together. During the Paris Commune, no one was executed until the aristocracy began executing the revolutionaries —only then did reprisals begin. You do not get to choose the terms of the struggle; they are imposed on you.

This recalls the well-known debate between Victor Serge and Trotsky. Serge, a fundamentally well-intentioned figure, argued that nothing should stand above human life in the abstract. But that position is mistaken: the emancipatory perspective stands above abstract human life. In a revolution, most people are spectators; it is the mass vanguard that actually leads the process. Many people are primarily concerned with who will win. If they see the bourgeoisie carrying out executions while the revolutionaries refrain, they will side with the bourgeoisie, because the revolutionaries appear weak. These are the laws of civil war.

The struggle between political tendencies is also governed by laws akin to those of civil war. Pre-revolutionary periods have their own rules as well—dialectically linked to the emancipatory horizon, yet still shaped by the logic of civil conflict. The party must therefore learn how to maneuver, how to confront, and how to engage in hard, sometimes ruthless political struggle.

This brings us back to the concept of the contemporaneity of the current and the party: the capacity to engage with real phenomena. Opportunism tends to be self-pitying; sect-like politics retreat inward because the world outside feels hostile or uncomfortable. The party is part of the subjectivity of the exploited and oppressed—it is itself an element of reality. One cannot assume that everything outside the party is reactionary; that is sect thinking. The party is built through a dialogue with reality, and reality contains many progressive elements.

Trotskyism has been functioning as a sect, and that is a problem— a sect we do not want to reproduce. It is so deeply sect-like that it often fails to recognize itself as such. sects are angry at reality itself; revolutionary currents are not—they direct their anger at what actually deserves to be confronted.

The party is a crucial link in a broader chain; at the same time, without the party, that chain leads nowhere. The contemporaneity of a current lies in its ability to learn from real movements while not simply trailing behind them. It also involves the composition of the current and the party, and the capacity not to leap ahead of unresolved problems. The central challenge is how to grow. Everything we have done so far has aimed at creating the conditions for that growth, because you cannot pole-vault without training. Now we have accumulated experience and trained—the question is: what will serve as our pole?

Revolution is coming—it is a material process, not merely an article of faith. It is deeply human to believe that nothing fundamentally different from what we have experienced will happen. It took Lenin six months to recover from the social-democratic betrayal during the First World War. But many things we have never experienced before will happen—and we must prepare for them by growing.

Footnotes

[1] A suggestive reflection by the German painter Max Ernst on the “dead ends” that arise in all human activity may be quoted here—with due license: “When I reach a dead end in my painting—which happens again and again—sculpture is the only way out, because sculpture is more of a game than painting. In sculpture both hands are involved, as in love. So it is as if I were taking a vacation, only to return afterward to painting.” (Max Ernst, Surrealism, Art and Cinema, Martina Mazzotta and Jürgen Pech, Skira, Madrid, 2024.)

[2] The idea of “unmastered contradictions” came to mind in the form of the “unmastered past” in postwar Germany (the former FRG), in reference to the complicity of the German bourgeoisie and the entire state apparatus with Nazism—an analogy that resonates strongly with the polarized world we are living through today. As a philosophical category, the notion appears in Ernst Bloch—cited in this context by Mandel: “The ‘unmastered past’ is certainly linked to the fact that in West Germany the social relations that made the fascist seizure of power possible still exist (…) Because the past cannot (or will not) be fully explained, it cannot be mastered.” (Mandel, 1973: 250)

The work in which Bloch develops this concept (a notion bearing certain similarities to Trotsky’s theory of uneven and combined development) is “Héritage de ce temps” (1935).

[3] The translation of “commuter” is daily traveler.

[4] It is precisely this density of reality that skeptical Marxists such as Valerio Arcary, or magazines like Jacobin.lat, tend to lose sight of.

5] The wildfires and extreme heat waves occurring around the world are among the many manifestations of global warming, just as the dramatic temperature plunges at the other extreme are (in Minneapolis, for example, temperatures are currently below freezing).

[6] Our position is clear: China is an imperialism in the making, and it has advanced steadily along that path. Unlike groups such as the Trotskyist Fraction, now rebranded as Permanent Revolution (PTS), we do not believe that China must necessarily go through a world war in order to become a fully-fledged imperialist power—which, in a certain sense, it already is. World wars are fought over hegemony within the world system of states; when Germany unleashed the two world wars of the last century, it was already an imperialist power, obviously. The Trotskyist Fraction has been wracking its brains for ten years over a debate it cannot resolve, largely because it has never drawn a serious balance sheet of Stalinism. It has turned into a coalition-type current, in which one of its two internal poles—the France–Brazil axis—holds positions that can easily slide into campism. It mixes up the question of becoming an imperialist power with the question of fighting for global hegemony—two related but not identical issues. If they were the same thing, one would have to defend the supposedly non-imperialist power, China—a campist position that Arcary openly defends.

[7] Historian Marc Ferro argues that one of the most objectively revolutionary conditions is the disruption of people’s ordinary living conditions. That is precisely what is unfolding in Minneapolis, as it did earlier in Los Angeles and Chicago—and as it could happen tomorrow in other U.S. cities.

[8] The “return of Lenin” is characteristic of the renewed revolutionary epoch we are living through: questions of imperialism, civil war, the right to national self-determination, the character of states (imperialist, independent, dependent, semi-colonial, colonial), and the role of the revolutionary party, among others.

[9] The character of present-day China is also debated by other Trotskyist currents. The argentinian PO (Partido Obrero), for example, holds a range of positions. Resistencia/Valerio Arcary advances a pro-China campist stance. What remains of the LIT(CI) adopts a schematic position: it defines China as imperialist but overlooks its contradictions and gray areas (we draw those nuances from Au Loong Yu, who highlights both China’s imperial ascent and its unresolved national questions). Meanwhile, the Mandelist or post-Mandelist USec and the British SWP also characterize China as imperialist—although the SWP, as usual, refuses to recognize the legitimate national question in Ukraine, something neither the Argentine Workers’ Party nor the PTS acknowledge either.

[10] ICE raids in U.S. cities targeting immigrants broadly resemble the fascist raids carried out in Italy in the early 1920s against cities governed by the Socialist Party (PS) or the Italian Communist Party (PCI). The scale, of course, is very different—and so is the level of popular resistance.

[11] This is what sharply distinguishes us from organizations such as the FT (Trotskyist Fraction), which refused to mobilize after the assassination attempt against Cristina Kirchner had occurred and absurdly opposed raising the demand for Bolsonaro’s imprisonment in Brazil. Today they are debating the theory of permanent revolution, and one of the positions in that debate argues that democratic tasks have no specific character of their own and must be subordinated to the socialist development of the process. On the other side, what remains of the LIT takes the opposite extreme: they have two separate programs in which democratic tasks become the axis of a stagist logic that breaks with the core of the theory of permanent revolution—according to which such tasks cannot be consistently resolved independently of the socialist character of the social transformation. (The LIT fully supported the shipment of imperialist weapons to Ukraine—a betrayal of trotskyist principles.)

Neither one position nor the other is correct: democratic tasks cannot be subordinated to the socialist character of the process; but from the standpoint of permanent revolution, they must be linked to the working-class and socialist perspective of the revolution—otherwise they cannot be resolved consistently.

[12] Alex Callinicos, in effect, also blurs the distinction between Bonapartism and fascism—contrary to Trotsky’s analysis (“Is the United States turning to fascism?”, Socialist Worker, 01/13/26). In the face of this confusion, it is worth recalling Trotsky’s lessons—not to downplay the dangers, which are real, but to assess them with precision: “If we have insisted on distinguishing Bonapartism from fascism, it has not been out of theoretical pedantry. Terms serve to differentiate concepts; and concepts, in politics, serve to distinguish real forces” (Trotsky, 1974: 46).

[13] Those who try to dismiss dialectics and reduce logic to mere formal logic are frankly ridiculous: under those conditions, it would be impossible to understand today’s contradictory and dialectical world.

[14] The journalist adds, referring to two of his interviewees: “Dan and Jane resist the idea that they have become politicized. A better word, Jane says, is humanists. Their anger is inseparable from the belief that Trump is violating Christian principles.”

[15] This also offers elements for analyzing Meloni’s government: a reactionary populist administration that cannot even clearly be defined as far right (bourgeois democracy continues to function in Italy).

[16] Alex Callinicos makes a strong point here: “(…) U.S. stock prices fell last Tuesday, the day before Trump arrived in Davos. America’s major corporations have been very careful not to challenge Trump personally. But, as historian Adam Tooze notes, while ‘individual players can be singled out and victimized, the “markets” are anonymous. You can’t retaliate against them in the same crude and direct way’” (“Sheriff Trump Opens Up a Rift in the Ruling Class,” Socialist Worker, 01/27/26).

[17] This tension between party-building and the prevailing political conditions is precisely what highlights the sharpness of Lenin’s thinking on this question.

[18] The “defeat” prematurely announced by Martín Mosquera, an ally of Valerio Arcary, has yet to materialize.

[19] The PTS’s policy is to lobby senators instead of fighting for a general strike—an approach that is wildly opportunistic. They insist, without hesitation, that “the law will pass” and that the task is merely “to make the senators pay a political price”…

[20] This, for example, is the position taken by Michael Roberts, a prominent British Marxist economist.

Bibliography

Kevin Anderson, “Trumpist fascism: the worm turns”, MRonline, 12/27/25.

Alex Callinicos, “Sheriff Trump opens up a rift in ruling clase”, Socialist Worker, 01/27/26

1982. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, Ediciones Solar, Argentina, 1982.

Ernest Mandel, *Germany, the revolution and fascism*, Juan Pablos Editor, Mexico, 1973.

Antonio Negri, *History of a communist II, Prison and exile*, Tinta Limón, Buenos Aires, 2022.

Leon Trotsky, *The struggle against fascism in Germany*, volume II, Ediciones Pluma, Buenos Aires, 1974.